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This article focuses on five flaws of Christian Fuchs’ approach of Web 2.0 economy. 
Here, Fuchs’ views on immaterial production, productivity of labor, commodification 
of users’ data, underestimation of financial aspects of digital economy, and the violation 
of Marx’s laws of value production, rate of exploitation, fall tendency of profit rate, 
and overproduction crisis are put into question. This article defends the thesis Fuchs 
fails to apply Marxian political economy to the contemporary phenomena of Web 2.0 
economy. It is possible to avoid Fuchs’ errors, and another approach is possible to 
remake Marxism relevant for an analysis of the new media economy.
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The concept of digital labor is one of the hotly debated issues in contemporary theories 
on new media economy. Put roughly, digital labor clusters around the questions of how 
communicative infrastructures of digital media are commercialized and commodified, 
where the economic value and profit of the new media companies come from, what 
social consequences the commercial captures of communicative infrastructures imply, 
and which theoretical paradigm to apply. The last issue involves political assessments 
that not only analyze the economical nature of digital media but also intervene in 
social consequences of the very reality of them.
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The ongoing debate on the new media economy, including the exchange between 
Fuchs (2012, 2015), Arvidsson and Colleoni (2012), Andrejevic (2015), Robinson 
(2015), Jin and Feenberg (2015), and Bolaño and Vieira (2015), engage with some 
important aspects of the social relations of ownership and power in commercialized 
infrastructures of the digital media. Marxism becomes a relevant issue here when the 
new media theorists try to reconfigure the critical conceptions of labor value, exploita-
tion, alienation, or economic crisis to address emerging new forms of the digital media 
economy such as surveillance and monitoring of users’ data for investment and com-
mercial purposes. On one hand, Marxism has a promising critical potential for offering 
a systematic approach that explains social roots, political consequences, and ideologi-
cal reflections of the digital media economy. On the other hand, it is challenged by the 
new forms of capitalism emerging from digital space and information-based value 
generation, which could not be foreseen or even imagined back in Marx’s time.
Those who reinforce a Marxian account face the challenge of reinterpreting and 
applying Marx, while the counteraccount, which declares Marx’s legacy partially out-
dated and is at pains to distance itself from Marxism, comes up with new conceptions 
that attempt to offer more consistent interpretations of the new media economy. In new 
media studies, the theorists usually focus on the basic conceptions such as labor and 
exploitation, but I would include here some critical contributions to the debate from 
other fields that do not ultimately aim to deepen the ongoing issues but rather offer 
fundamental solutions for social problems that are radically different from Marx’s or 
anyone else’s in this regard. Such a critical turn from the classical approaches of social 
theory is clearly manifested in Thomas Piketty’s (2014) Capital and his critics.
Piketty is worth mentioning here because his input recently caused an obvious 
change or even a reversal in some of the Marxist interpretations of the critical media 
theorists (e.g., Fuchs 2014b). The issue at stake here is that monitoring and surveil-
lance are not only technological tools for digital exploitation of media users or sources 
for value generation, but they can also be used to watch economic activities of the 
media companies. This perspective clearly suggests reversing the power relations 
between usage and ownership of the new media, and turning the tools of exploitation 
against the exploiters themselves. One of the crucial questions is whether Marxian or 
non-Marxian proposals, including Piketty, offer a consistent approach for interpreting 
and changing the social role and impacts of the new media economy. This article 
focuses on Fuchs’ account and his understanding of Marxism with regard to the new 
media economy, and tries to expose the relevance of a Marxist interpretation of media 
as it is patronized by Fuchs in response to non-Marxian conceptualizations of the 
social reality of the new media.
In his previous articles published in this journal (Fuchs 2012, 2015), as well as in 
his recent book Digital Labour and Karl Marx (2014a), Fuchs attempts to offer a 
Marxian account to understand the economic foundations of the Web 2.0 economy. 
Considering he is one of the few scholars trying to fill the gap between Marxian cri-
tique of political economy and new economic forms of the digital media, we ought to 
take his point of view in the current debate seriously.
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In this article, I will summarize Fuchs’ understanding of digital labor economy, and 
shortly revisit his critics, and then focus on five flaws in his account. There are pas-
sages in Marx’s economic studies that are completely ignored or misinterpreted by 
Fuchs and are decisive against his views on digital media economy. Based on the 
textual evidence, I will argue that Fuchs contradicts the Marxian foundations of the 
critique of political economy. Fuchs’ commitment to offer a Marxian approach lapses 
into an anachronism due to the following reasons: (1) Fuchs fails to acknowledge that 
Marx has adopted the concept of immaterial production, (2) he confuses objective 
human activity with productive labor, (3) he uses an unclear terminology regarding 
commodification of user data on digital media, (4) he underestimates the financial 
aspect of digital media economy, (5) he violates Marxian laws of value production, 
rate of exploitation, rate of profit, and economic crisis.
Here, I will not argue whether Marx’s critique of political economy is right or 
wrong but only show that Fuchs misinterprets him. The critique of Fuchs’ account 
shall serve to remake the Marxian view of economics fruitful for the current debates 
on digital media economy to reframe the questions of users’ online activity, and pri-
vacy and personal convenience in the contemporary, socioeconomic context.
The Karl Marx problem I will be discussing here is not simply about the question 
of whether Marx’s social critique still applies today or not, but it is also related to a 
charge of exploitation in terms of scientific critique and political action. Fuchs’ 
approach cripples the promising potential of Marxism for the issues at stake, and the 
discussion below attempts to highlight some possible ways to avoid Fuchs’ flaws and 
contributes to gain a solid ground to offer a Marxist perspective on interpreting and 
changing some crucial components of the new media economy.
Fuchs’ Understanding of Digital Labor Economy, and His 
Critics
Fuchs’ theory can be characterized as defensive, on the one side, and progressive, on 
the other. By defensive, I mean that he offers a critical account rejecting several criti-
cisms of Marx such as Arendt (1998), Habermas (1973, 1988), Lazzarato (1996), and 
Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004). His approach is also progressive because he tries to 
apply Marxist political economy to the new forms of capitalist mode of production 
such as digital labor, value production, and exploitation of Internet users in the new 
media economy, and so on. This is where he faces further criticisms articulated in 
Arvidsson and Colleoni (2012), Andrejevic (2015), Robinson (2015), Jin and Feenberg 
(2015), and Bolaño and Vieira (2015).
Fuchs begins his intervention with a critique of immaterial labor. The concept of 
immaterial labor became fashionable in current debates first by Lazzarato, and then by 
Hardt and Negri. Lazzarato (1996, 143–44) defines it as the activity that produces “the 
informational and cultural content of the commodity.” Hardt and Negri (2004, 108) 
have adopted this definition and applied it to an extensive Marx critique. They intro-
duce the term as creation of “immaterial products, such as knowledge, information, 
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communication, a relationship, or an emotional response.” Although they engender 
immaterial labor in Empire (2000, 293) into (1) “informationalized” industrial produc-
tion incorporating “communication technologies,” (2) “analytical and symbolic tasks,” 
and, finally (3) “production and manipulation of effect,” they dropped the first type of 
immaterial labor in Multitude (2004, 108). For Fuchs (2014a, 252), the term “immate-
rial” is misleading, because it discharges into some kind of substantial dualism sepa-
rating the world into two distinct entities: material and immaterial. Accordingly, 
spiritual activities such as mental labor, or products of this kind, for instance, informa-
tion and knowledge, are detached from nature and matter. Fuchs (2014a, 362) argues 
that the term immaterial is unsound in this regard. “In a materialist philosophy, the 
whole world is material.”
Fuchs (2010, 188; 2012, 141; 2014a, 102; 2015, 67–68) asserts that Internet users 
generate value for digital media platforms that are sold to advertisement companies. 
The main source of value production is users’ activities commodified as statistical 
data. As users are not paid for their activities, their labor is free, unpaid, and infinitely 
exploited.
Arvidsson and Colleoni (2012, 136) object that Fuchs’ approach on value creation 
is poorly related to social media platforms. The basic premise of Marx’s labor theory 
does not hold. Profit of new digital media does not originate from “sale of commodi-
ties” but from “appropriation and distribution of value” within the finance sector. Not 
the value production but the financial rent becomes here fundamental. Andrejevic 
(2015, 6–7) underlines that the time spent on the Internet has a particular effect on 
exposure to online ads, which provides detailed data about user behavior. More time 
spent “creating and engaging with forms of content, in turn, attract and hold users.” He 
stresses that digital value emerges in “revenue generation” and “financial valuation.” 
Robinson (2015, 50) asserts that the value circulated in digital space does not come 
from Web 2.0 but from commercial capital of the advertising sector. Jin and Feenberg 
(2015, 53, 57) agree with Fuchs that Internet users are “exploited in some sense” but 
claim that the path Fuchs follows is narrow-minded, because Marx’s own concepts of 
labor and value do not apply to Internet economy from the very beginning. Finally, 
Bolaño and Vieira (2015, 57–58) reject Fuchs’ exploitation thesis. User activity does 
not produce value. The so-called “free” access to digital media is an illusion, and its 
financial source originates from the advertising sector.
All these criticisms address Fuchs’ approach to his progressive strategy. Some of 
them overreach a fundamental critique of Marxist political economy via Fuchs’ work; 
others point at Fuchs’ own inconsistencies. When facing critique, Fuchs usually regen-
erates his defensive strategy that is practically a kind of theoretic struggle to retain 
Marx’s legacy for the contemporary critical media theory. In the following section, I 
show that he fails to do so.
Immaterial Production in Marx
Let us first begin with mental labor. Marx (1996, 188) gives a famous example about 
this. What distinguishes, he says, “the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that 
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the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality.” Every 
type of work is a process transforming raw material into some final product. This pro-
cess requires conscious mental activity. Marx’s Theories on Surplus Value document 
quite a resourceful debate on this matter.
Here, Marx (1965b, 146, 152, 181–82, 240, 256–58, 329, 385–86; see also Marx, 
1962, 382, 674) adopts the term nonmaterial production, and speaks of “spiritual 
labor,” “spiritual worker,” and “spiritual production” as synonyms for “non-material” 
labor, worker, and production. For Marx, mental labor in nonmaterial production is the 
work of actors, artists, clerics, doctors, economists, judges, lawyers, mistresses, ora-
tors, police officers, priests, professors, servants, scientists, soldiers, state officials, 
teachers, writers, and so on. Moreover, Marx (1965b, 256–60, 270) underlines that all 
labor including immaterial or spiritual production endures certain material products. 
He also argues that the material or immaterial aspects of capitalist mode of production 
cannot be genuinely understood, unless respective particular historical forms of pro-
duction are taken into account.
Marx (1965b, 385–86) distinguishes two forms of “immaterial production” in the 
capitalist production process. The first form is related to the production of “saleable 
commodities” such as “books, paintings, in short all the products of artistic creation.” 
However, this kind of immaterial production is limited to the extent that, for example, 
a writer of a joint work such as an encyclopedia “exploits a number of others as hacks.” 
The second form of immaterial production is realized by mental laborer as productive 
worker. Marx points out that mental labor can be productive and unproductive respec-
tively. For example, a teacher as wage laborer is productive for the owner of the insti-
tution. But she is unproductive vis-à-vis her pupils. Similarly, in theaters, “the actor’s 
relation to the public is that of artist, but vis-à-vis his employer he is a productive 
worker.”
To characterize a particular production process as material and immaterial depends 
on the related components in that process. Materiality encompasses all social and his-
torical conditions, factors, and relations of the production process. Thus, mental labor 
refers to a specific moment within the material production, through which the immate-
rial production is realized. Put it crudely, the basic difference between mental and 
immaterial aspects of production process is that the former one emphasizes a neces-
sary component involved in all labor processes, while the latter consummates a certain 
appearance form of mental labor. This is not acknowledged by Fuchs. He, however, 
raises a philosophical question in this regard: can we speak of something immaterial 
in a pure material world? To do justice to Marx, we probably need to follow a dialecti-
cal path.
Marx, unlike Fuchs, grasps the world as a reflection of forms of matter on different 
levels. Some entities or structures may seem like immaterial on one level, while these 
appear as material on another. Immaterial production is a social structure, which 
involves both material and immaterial aspects respectively. Mental activities in imma-
terial labor do really seem different than the physical objects we perceive by our 
senses. The products of mental labor, however, are an “expenditure of a certain amount 
of human muscles, nerves, brain” (Marx 1987, 272). Likewise, the virtual reality of 
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cyberspace seems to be something immaterial. But it is material on the level of elec-
tromagnetic and cyber-optic physics.
The Italian autonomists define immaterial labor in terms of its products rather than 
its social and technical role in capitalist production process. Immateriality of labor 
refers here, accordingly, to physical features of a labor product, not to its social char-
acter. Marx, by contrast, conceives of immateriality not as a second substance involved 
in a separate section of production process but as the appearance of physical features 
of the material product and the social relations of the production process. We can rein-
force Marx’s argument here that the products of mental labor appear to be immaterial 
entities, which are essentially material on the level of physical, neurological, and bio-
logical activities of the human body and on the level of material existence of the very 
products.
Objective Activity and Productive Labor
Fuchs assumes that Internet user activity is an unconscious production process. By 
being productive, he means value producing labor for capital. At first glance, this 
seems to fit into Marx’s definition of productive labor. Productive labor, unlike unpro-
ductive labor, does enrich capital by entering into direct relation with it. But the same 
approach violates the very definition of labor being in a direct exchange relation with 
capital. The exchange relation is not the relation between online media users and 
online media owners, but the media company with its employees and the media com-
pany with other companies. In the Marxian sense, we deal neither with labor nor with 
productive labor when considering the users of Web 2.0 media. But do the data that are 
generated, collected, and sold to companies count as commodities?
Marx gives considerable examples that enable a comparison between raw materials 
of material production and user activity as raw material for value production. Natural 
resources exploited by capital have the same characteristics as user activity in that 
both are transformed and commodified in the capitalist mode of production. Natural 
forces such as steam and water are appropriated by the capitalist and cost nothing. As 
a human being requires lungs to breathe with, so “he requires something that is work 
of man’s hand, in order to consume natural forces productively” (Marx 1962, 407; 
1996, 389). A waterwheel, for instance, is “necessary to exploit force of water, and a 
steam-engine to exploit the elasticity of steam” (Marx 1962, 407; 1996, 389). It is not 
the natural resources that produce value but the human labor that appropriates, trans-
forms, and processes them. For this purpose, machines as components of constant 
capital are widely used. They, however, create no value but simply yield up their own 
value to the product that they serve to beget (Marx 1962, 308; 1996, 390).
Digital media consist of software and hardware, cyberspaces and workplaces, as 
well as algorithmic systems and collective organization mechanisms. Based on Marx’s 
theory, the collection of commodified user data would require, first, a procedure pro-
cessing the raw material of gigantic data about users into useful information before it 
is sold to the third party. And second, the productive labor does not originate from unpaid 
user activity but from the labor that creates those software and hardware, cyberspace and 
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workplace. All the algorithmic systems and machinery yield up their labor to the com-
modity that is sold to a third party.
Users’ Data as a Commodity
Fuchs defines users’ data as a commodity sold to advertising clients at a price that is 
larger than the invested constant and variable capital. The surplus value contained in 
this commodity is created by users and by employees of the media platforms. “The 
difference is that the users are unpaid, and therefore infinitely exploited,” writes Fuchs 
(2012, 143). Based on Marx’s terminology, we have shown that users’ activity does 
not produce value. This makes us question whether the data that were sold to the third 
party were already a commodity before they were processed by media platforms, or 
they were commodified through this procedure. Fuchs is unclear about this. On the 
one side, he claims that digital media “collects all private data and user behavior and 
commodifies both,” but on the other side, he asserts that users’ activity is productive 
labor. The latter thesis contradicts the process that privately generated user data 
“become commodified” (Fuchs 2010, 147).
Unlike the user activity on the web, the labor power owned by workers is sold to 
the capitalist as a commodity. The labor of the worker produces the value, for which he 
is paid, and the surplus, which is appropriated by the capitalist for free. If user activity 
already generates value, then this makes the user data already a commodity. If user data 
have “become commodified” by the corresponding algorithmic procedure, then they 
were not commodities before their transformation into commodities to be sold to adver-
tising clients. As Fuchs assumes to have discovered the biggest scandal of labor exploita-
tion in human history, he insists on value production generated by the user activity. 
Notwithstanding, he speaks of an additional commodification process that comes exter-
nally to the same procedure. But user activity is accorded to exploitation not as commod-
ity but as raw material. This exploitation character of user activity detaches the same 
activity from its alleged value and surplus value-creating character. At this point, there is 
no other option left than that the users’ data is commodified by the information process-
ing procedure, which is commonly ascribed to the labor of digital media workers.
Dislocation of the Source of Profit
None of the calculations Fuchs (2015, 67–69) makes with regard to the digital value 
production on media platforms contributes to the question of where all the profits of 
media companies come from. His theoretic attention focuses on why user activity is to 
be considered as unpaid and infinitely exploited labor, while the statistical charts he 
presents are mostly based on profit shares of media companies. The multiplication of 
user time spent on the web with the number of users does not prove his exploitation 
thesis. Moreover, his exploitation thesis dislocates the source of profit made by media 
companies from selling the advertisement rights to the value production of Internet 
users. The issues of brand value and financial rent rightfully questioned by Fuchs’ crit-
ics are additional aspects that are missing from his account.
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The increasing rate of exploitation of labor, the decreasing wage of labor below its 
original value, the decreasing costs of constant capital, the relative overpopulation of 
workers on market, foreign trade, and enrichment of capital stock are a few of the rea-
sons for the growing exploitation of surplus and for increased profits (Marx 1965a, 242–
50). These are also counterfactuals that slow down the tendency of the profit rate to fall. 
Starting from the assumption that because user activity is productive labor, the lion’s 
share of value production shall be traced back to the infinite exploitation of free labor of 
“NetSlaves” (Terranova 2000, 33). In this regard, the current dispute between Fuchs, and 
Arvidsson and Colleoni seems to shift to a strict division between value production, on 
one hand, and financial realization, on the other. Ergo, the struggle between a defense of 
Marx’s legacy and its autonomist critique is regenerated over and over again.
Although it is correct that the financial sector plays a great role in appropriating and 
distributing asset value, the same argument does forego that value is not created else-
where. Arvidsson and Colleoni’s reference to the autonomist critique of Marxist politi-
cal economy does not establish a legitimate basis for developing a completely new 
theory. Fuchs’ objection highlights this tendency, but he pays for that, as I shall argue 
in the next section, an expensive price: violating the fundamental laws of Marx’s polit-
ical economy. The culminating point we need to recognize in this battle is that the 
financial maximization of asset value, the direct relation between popularity of a par-
ticular Internet platform and its brand value (Arvidsson and Colleoni 2012, 141), as 
well as the relation between fixed and financial capital (Andrejevic 2015, 11), support 
a Marxist account of the web economy rather than turn Marx upside-down.
Fuchs’ Violation of Marxian Laws of Economy
The rate of exploitation is defined by Marx as the proportional relation of produced 
surplus to variable capital (exploitation rate = surplus / variable capital). Variable capi-
tal is the money-capital to purchase labor power. Constant capital, by contrast, is the 
money-capital to purchase the means of production such as machinery. Fuchs assumes 
that because Internet users are not paid for their activities, and yet they still produce a 
greater part of all the value distributed in the digital era, they exemplify a new kind of 
productive labor that produces surplus and equals to zero as variable capital. This is 
why he speaks of infinite exploitation. First, this equation is mathematically impossi-
ble. A fraction with zero in the denominator cannot be defined (also highlighted in 
Andrejevic 2015, 9). Second, Fuchs (2012, 145) tries to solve this problem by separat-
ing the variable capital representing wage laborers in media companies and the vari-
able capital referring to the unpaid labor of web users: exploitation rate = surplus / 
(variable capital 1 + variable capital 2). This reformulation seems to avoid the math-
ematical error of the zero in the denominator, but it contradicts his assumption regard-
ing the exploitation of users’ value production. The alleged value production of the 
web users is still incalculable apart from the value produced by media employees. As 
long as Fuchs insists on identifying user activity with value production, this problem 
remains unsolved. Nevertheless, this has lethal impacts on Marx’s theory about falling 
profit rates and the crisis of overproduction.
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The profit rate is defined as the proportional relation of surplus to the sum of con-
stant and variable capital: profit rate = surplus / (constant capital + variable capital) 
(Marx 1965a, 251). Fuchs’ exploitation thesis indicates that the nullified costs of vari-
able capital of users’ free labor and the maximized production of surplus explain the 
huge profit of media companies. This means that as long as the new media economy is 
based on free labor of Internet users, the profit rates would not fall. Marx, by contrast, 
wrote that over time, profit rates would fall due to various reasons: the mass of surplus, 
the accumulation of capital, the capital revenues, the rate of exploitation, and the 
increase in the number of workers. Falling profit rates, Marx (1965a, 223) underlines, 
is a particular expression of the capitalist mode of production. The elements of infinite 
exploitation, by contrast, disable this tendency.
This contradiction leaves two options for Fuchs here. If his thesis on infinite exploi-
tation is true, than we need to modify the whole Marxist critique of political economy, 
as Hardt and Negri already assert. This leads us to support the autonomist Marx cri-
tique that the new forms of capitalism as such did not exist and could not be predicted 
in the nineteenth century capitalism. Ergo, Marx needs to be rethought. The second 
option is that the thesis on value production of web users is untenable and should sim-
ply be given up. This would conflict with Fuchs’ whole approach to make Marx’s 
legacy relevant for the digital media economy.
It is well known but also widely questioned how Marx saw the capitalist mode of 
production as one that would self-destruct via falling profit rates that end in economic 
crisis. The theoretical line Fuchs follows not only disproves Marx in this regard but 
also contradicts Marx’s notions of the overproduction and underconsumption crises 
that ought to originate from users’ data. Even if there is an infinite amount of data to 
be transformed into metadata, and to be sold to the third party, they cannot be overpro-
duced or insufficiently consumed. If user data cannot be overproduced by web users 
or underconsumed by advertising clients, then Fuchs’ alleged digital labor represents 
an area where Marx’s economic laws of the capitalist mode of production do not work. 
His argument is supposed to be a defense of Marx; obviously, it is not.
Fuchs on Piketty
Fuchs (2014b) foregrounds a conspicuous combination of his defensive and progres-
sive approaches in a review essay of Thomas Piketty’s (2014) book Capital. Piketty 
(2014, 9) famously claims that Marx has predicted an
apocalyptic end to capitalism: either the rate of return on capital would steadily diminish 
(thereby killing the engine of accumulation and leading to violent conflict among 
capitalists), or capital’s share of national income would increase indefinitely (which 
sooner or later would unite the workers in revolt).
What Piketty (2014, 228–29) sees as failed returns to capital corresponds to Marx’s 
falling rate of profit and downfall of capitalists. Capitalists either “tear each other apart 
in a desperate attempt to combat the falling rate of profit” or “they force labor to accept 
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a smaller and smaller share of national income, which ultimately leads to a proletarian 
revolution and general expropriation.” Fuchs (2014b, 418) writes how Piketty basi-
cally agrees with Marx’s point that capital is undermined by its internal contradictions. 
But he asserts that Piketty misinterprets the relationship between economic crisis and 
revolutionary political struggle. Marx speaks of mutually exclusive tendencies 
involved in profit rates. Countervailing tendencies, such as lowering wages, or par-
ticular methods regarding absolute and relative surplus value production make the 
Marxian law not a deterministic but a tendential one. Crises increase potentials for 
revolutionary movements, but they do not necessarily cause them (Piketty 2014, 419).
Fuchs displays his progressive approach with regard to Piketty’s proposal for a 
transparent and fair global tax system. Piketty’s main concern is detecting the sources 
of and finding realistic solutions for inequality in capitalism. Put simply, economic 
inequality emerges when “the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of 
output and income” (Piketty 2014, 1). Piketty (2014, 27) commends to establish inter-
national economic institutions and introduce regulatory policies that surveil tax pay-
ments and act swiftly against tax related illegal activities. The problem with the current 
system is that “multinational corporations often end up paying ridiculously small 
amounts because they can assign all their profits artificially to a subsidiary located in 
a place where taxes are very low” (Piketty 2014, 561). So the point is to prevent trans-
national corporations from exploiting tax loopholes and avoiding taxes. Such mea-
sures enable a redistribution of wealth away from capital toward general public 
services. To increase the capital share and to decrease the wage share, we need an 
institutional power that is capable of surveilling and regulating all the income-out-
come traffic on a global scale.
Piketty (2014, 532) also admits he is not suggesting we abolish capitalism but that 
we “reassert control over capitalism in the name of the general interest while relying 
on the forces of private property and competition.” Fuchs (2014b, 427–28) celebrates 
the idea but extends the limits of Piketty’s theory to revolutionary measures. He men-
tions Engels’s idea in 1845 to introduce a progressive tax system to raise money for 
public services and “at the same time replace all the present, unjustly distributed taxes” 
(Engels 1975, 254). This proposal plans for
a general, progressive tax on capital, at a rate increasing with the size of the capital. In 
this way, the burden of public administration would be shared by everyone according to 
his ability and would no longer fall mainly on the shoulders of those least able to bear it, 
as has hitherto been the case in all countries. (Engels 1975, 254)
Following Engels’s views, Fuchs (2014b, 428) argues that a leftist political agenda 
must embrace Piketty’s proposal for a global tax system that involves a global com-
puter network both to monitor the financial records of money transactions and to cre-
ate a transparent and accessible public databank of all the capital flows and corporate 
revenues. This might be considered as his first step toward transforming the Internet 
into a noncommercial and free platform for information sharing (Piketty 2014, 426). 
His proposed metasurveillance system of media companies’ financial actions aims to 
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reverse the power relations between new media users and owners, and to transform the 
productive resources concentrated in the hands of the few into a commonly owned and 
controlled open-access global network system. This certainly is a counterchallenge to 
Piketty’s idea of tax reform, and it requires much more than simply monitoring and 
preventing the exploitation of legal loopholes by international companies. Fuchs tar-
gets the digital exploitation of new media users, calling on them to intervene and 
control in the very structures for digital information to capture media owners and to 
confiscate the means of digital communication. In this vision, the digital exploitation 
of Internet users finally disappears. Fuchs’ account shares much of the revolutionary 
goals of a progressive agenda to transform the future of the new media economy, even 
if his defense of Marx suffers from the aforementioned flaws.
Conclusion
We might rightfully wonder how Fuchs conceives of a Marxist political agenda for a 
digital media economy that violates Marx’s fundamental laws of the capitalist mode of 
production. In the end, what we encounter here is that Fuchs becomes a victim of his 
own ambition by drafting ideological tasks into a progressive agenda for the new cen-
tury. This agenda does not rely upon but rather repudiates the fundamentals of 
Marxism. This might be an unfortunate fallacy for a theory at its abstract levels of 
conceptualization and methodology, but it is even more unfortunate in its practical 
application when it exacerbates the conspicuous call to a political action in a slogan 
such as “Digital Workers of the World, Unite!” (Fuchs 2015). Here, what the message 
implies at first glance leads to a conclusion that is entirely alien to what Marx’s theory 
indicates.
The core of the Karl Marx problem in this debate appears to arise from Fuchs’ 
greatest asset, which is also his main flaw: the idea of the infinite exploitation of pro-
sumers. It seems to me that we have two mutually exclusive options at hand. Either we 
give up the idea that Internet users are NetSlaves, or we do not. Although it is quite 
unlikely that Fuchs would pick the former option, the counterposition, as I have 
exposed here, not only avoids Fuchs’ controversial errors but also enables us as Marxist 
scholars of communication to carve out a secure terrain for the kind of political agenda 
that Fuchs ultimately endorses. This option would involve unconditional patronage for 
a noncommercial Internet, surveillance-free digital media, and transparent informa-
tion sharing in global network systems. The list of political responses can be extended, 
but it does not include, as far as I am concerned, the infinite exploitation of web users.
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